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Abstract
Drawing on the public accountability literature, mainly using Bovens’ concepts of accountability as mechanism
and accountability as a virtue, this paper reviews existing strategies for conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
accountability in the humanitarian sector and compares their advantages and shortcomings.
Humanitarian work takes place in contexts that are characterised by inherent power imbalances between donors, 
humanitarian organisations, local communities and aff ected populations. In this context, humanitarian organisations 
have a multitude of accountability relationships, some of them are formal – for example, through contracts with 
donors – while others are legal and political obligations. Others are informal, such as those with aff ected populations 
who do not have any formal power to hold these organisations accountable. 
Eff orts from humanitarian organisations to become more accountable have to date mainly focused on accountability 
virtue, a normative concept that defi nes accountable behaviour, and the sector has developed a multitude of 
voluntary standards and business inspired frameworks. However, less attention has been paid to accountability as 
a mechanism, which requires organisations to explain and justify their conduct to a forum and face judgement. It 
appears that donors are the only existing forum to which humanitarian organisations do have to give an account and 
be answerable for their acts and performance. 
The author argues that a mix of these approaches (virtue and mechanism) could improve accountability in the 
humanitarian sector. However, the success of such an approach to humanitarian accountability will essentially depend 
on how far both donors and humanitarian organisations are willing to let go of power and control. 
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1. Introduction 
Accountability has been a major theme in government reforms around the world and is closely linked to the 
development of the modern nation state and bureaucracy, with a growing role of the State as a provider of public 
goods, and to the request to make governments more ‘accountable’ to their citizens.1 Many of these changes have 
been part of wider organisational processes, often brought on by a tight fiscal environment, a push for value for 
money and changes in government policy.2 The academic literature and donor and humanitarian policy documents 
show a sharp increase in the use of the word accountability in the past two decades.3 
The last two decades have also seen an increase in humanitarian spending, staff and organisations working in crisis-
affected countries. The appearance of accountability in the humanitarian sector has also coincided with the global 
rise of multinational corporations, multilateral organisations and international NGOs, and the call for accountability 
for these actors. Attempts to make governments more efficient and effective in the deployment of public resources 
have also led to more pressure from donors to reform the humanitarian system and for humanitarian organisations 
to become more effective and results-oriented.4 This has led to tighter levels of scrutiny from media and more calls 
for ‘accountability’ from donors and governments in the global north. Moreover, donor governments have become 
more involved in humanitarian crises and the policies and programmes to address them. It follows from a political and 
public climate that increasingly demands transparency and accountability.5
With a growing number of actors present in humanitarian crisis situations, humanitarian organisations must compete 
for funds, showing that they can deliver results and value for money. In response to calls for greater transparency 
and accountability humanitarian organisations have started adopting tools and frameworks that originate from the 
business and industry sectors, and have made attempts to operate in a more business and results-oriented manner.6 
Donors have also sought to improve humanitarian accountability by requiring humanitarian organisations to apply 
results-based management, use participatory methodologies and invest in innovation.7 Many of these reforms are 
aimed at improving efficiency and making organisations more accountable. Humanitarian organisations have thus 
invested more resources and staff to become more responsive to affected populations, using client language chiming 
with business jargon. Participatory methodologies and information communications technology have ensured that 
affected populations today are more connected with humanitarian organisations than ever before. 
Nevertheless, concerns about lack of accountability in the humanitarian sector keep reappearing in the academic 
literature and in the media,8 and little evidence exists to show that humanitarian organisations have become 
more accountable. In particular, organisations face criticism for having failed to become more accountable to 
affected populations.9 
Drawing on public accountability theory, using Bovens’ concepts of accountability as a mechanism and accountability 
as a virtue, this paper aims to shed some light on and contextualise some of the current dilemmas in the humanitarian 
accountability debate. By unpicking accountability as a concept, the paper examines some of the challenges and 
opportunities for humanitarian accountability. 
The first section of this paper defines accountability as a concept and how it has been adapted and implemented 
by humanitarian organisations. The second section analyses accountability as a mechanism and the third explores 
accountability as a virtue. The final section concludes by looking at how these forms of accountability can be applied 
in the humanitarian sector going forward. 
1  Mark Bovens, Robert E Goodin, Thomas Schillemans, Oxford Handbook on Public Accountability. (Oxford University Press, 2014).
2  Rachel Scott, ‘Imagining more effective humanitarian aid: A donor perspective’ (2014) OECD, 3 <www.oecd.org/dac/Imagining%20
More%20Effective%20Humanitarian%20Aid_October%202014.pdf> accessed 5 November 2018.
3  Austen Davis, ‘Concerning accountability of humanitarian action’ (2007) HPN Network Paper No. 5, 3 <www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8735.pdf> accessed 5 October 2018; Anna Drake, ‘Locating accountability: Conceptual and categorical 
challenges in the literature. Policy Report 2’ (2012) ENTWINED and the International Institute for Sustainable Development, 5–6 <www.iisd.org/
pdf/2012/locating_accountability.pdf> accessed 1 October 2018; Bayard Roberts, ‘Accountability’ in Tim Allen, Anna Macdonald, Henry Radice 
(eds), Humanitarianism: A Dictionary of Concepts (Routledge, 2018) 1.
4  Davis (n 3) 5.
5  Ibid, 3. 
6  Ibid, 4.
7  Alice Obrecht, Alexandra T Warner, ‘More than just luck: Innovation in humanitarian action’ (2016) HIF/ALNAP Study (ALNAP/ODI).
8  Most recently the so-called Oxfam Scandal. ‘Oxfam Haiti allegations: How the scandal unfolded’ (21 February 2018) BBC News <https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43112200> accessed 10 September 2018.
9  Lois Austin, Dayna Brown, Paul Knox Clarke, Imogen Wall (eds), ‘Humanitarian Accountability Report’ (2018) CHS Alliance <https://
www.chsalliance.org/files/files/Humanitarian%20Accountability%20Report%202018.pdf> accessed 15 October 2018; Mark DuBois, ‘The new 
humanitarian basics’ (2018) HPG Working Paper, 1 <www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12201.pdf> accessed 28 November 
2018. 
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2. Defining accountability
Accountability is the buzzword of our times and has become an integral part of humanitarian policy and rhetoric. 
While its inclusion in policy documents and donor commitments has increased attention on the concept, a definition 
of accountability remains elusive. Despite the wide usage of accountability, one of the major difficulties with 
analysing accountability is that it means different things to different actors, and they tend to adopt different concepts 
of accountability.10
To analyse humanitarian accountability, it is thus useful to unpick accountability as a concept and what we expect 
from humanitarian accountability. While no agreed definition exists, most scholars agree that accountability comes 
from the notion that if those in power are held accountable, they will use their power less arbitrarily.11 This traditional 
concept of accountability is closely linked to the Western ideology of democracy where sovereignty lies with the 
citizen and the authority must be held to account.12 Voters make representatives answer for their policies, legislators 
can scrutinise the actions of public servants and make them answerable and members of the public can seek redress 
from government agencies.13 Accountability is essentially the ability to know what an actor is doing and the ability to 
make that actor do something else.
One of the main challenges when applying accountability to humanitarian organisations is the fact they operate 
outside traditional public accountability frameworks, i.e. most of their work takes place outside their country of origin 
and there is neither a global government nor global citizens. Further, humanitarian organisations are not elected 
by the people they serve and, while they might need permission from the government of the country where they 
operate, they are not formally required to get approval to implement their activities from the communities in which 
they work.14 Humanitarian organisations must also choose whom to assist not only within a community but in a 
national and sometimes global context, and they can face accountabilities in several settings at one single time. 
Further, humanitarian organisations operate in contexts of armed conflict, often plagued by ethnic or religious 
tensions, entrenched gender roles and socioeconomic inequalities and forced displacement. These contexts often 
lack the basic conditions for accountability to take place, i.e. lack of central authorities in charge of enforcement. Public 
accountability research shows that establishing accountability mechanisms is particularly challenging in conflict-
affected contexts, where the state has a weak capacity to protect people and lacks the organisational capabilities to 
address accountability challenges.15
Over the past two decades, several attempts have been made by different consortiums and individual organisations 
to define humanitarian accountability. The most commonly agreed definition is the 2010 Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership Standard which defines accountability as:
‘…the means through which power is used responsibly. It is a process of taking into account the views of, and 
being held accountable by, different stakeholders, and primarily the people affected by authority or power.’
The definition highlights the responsible use of power to different stakeholders, putting affected populations at the 
top of the list. It does not, however, specify what mechanisms are to be used to hold organisations accountable. One 
of the main questions that arises in this context is what kind of accountability an organisation would like to achieve in 
a particular setting and to whom, for what purposes and how.
A common criticism of humanitarian organisations is that they are not being accountable enough, but it is important 
to highlight that organisations have multiple accountabilities and must constantly choose which relationships to 
prioritise. Accountabilities can include those to national authorities, international donors, sectors/clusters, home 
country public and taxpayers, bodies of law, professional standards and the communities where the organisations 
work.16 Being accountable to one actor does not automatically make an organisation more accountable as a whole 
since different accountability demands can be incompatible, and choices must be made between them.17 Hence, 
trying to be more accountable to one actor does not always make an organisation more accountable. Instead, it 
will depend on the capacity and resources available to the organisation and the reasons for trying to become more 
accountable.
10  Bovens, Schillemans, Goodin (n 1).
11  Drake (n 3) 9.
12  Ruth W Grant, Robert O Keohane, ‘Accountability and abuses of power in world politics’ (2005) American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, 
No. 1, 29; Davis (n 3) 1.
13  Julia Steets, Andrea Binder, András Derzsi-Horváth, Susanna Krüger, Lotte Ruppert, ‘Drivers and inhibitors of change in the humanitarian 
system: A political economy analysis of reform efforts relating to cash, accountability to affected populations and protection’ (2016) Berlin, Global 
Public Policy Institute, 28 <www.gppi.net/2016/05/12/drivers-and-inhibitors-of-change-in-the-humanitarian-system> accessed 15 September 
2019.
14  Michael Szporluk, ‘A framework for understanding accountability of international NGOs and global good governance’ (2009) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 340.
15  Hamish Nixon, Anne L Buffardi, Joseph Wales, Tina Pasanen, ‘Supporting accountability in fragile settings: A review for the Somalia 
Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme’ (2017) ODI, 16–19 <www.odi.org/publications/10870-supporting-
accountability-fragile-settings-review-somalia-implementation-and-analysis-action> accessed 15 September 2019.
16  Davis (n 3) 9. See also Table 1.
17  Jonathan GS Koppel, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”’ (2005) Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, 94–108, 95.
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Responding to multiple accountabilities to many different actors at the same time can bring about what Koppel refers 
to as Multiple Accountabilities Disorder (MAD). MAD can lead to a lack of specificity about what an organisation wants 
to achieve with its accountability efforts which in turn may undermine the organisation’s success.18 The table below 
outlines some of the many possible accountabilities for humanitarian organisations.
Table 1. Accountabilities for humanitarian organisations19
Location of 
accountability
To whom Accountability elements Type of 
accountability 
Concept
Country where the 
organisation operates
National authorities National law
Access and mandate agreements
Humanitarian agency coordination: 
United Nations Country Teams 
(UNCT), Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework (CRRF), etc.
Standards and systems, for example 
health
Legal Mechanism
Local communities Engagement and consultation
Service agreements
Contracts (facilities etc.)
Participatory Virtue
Affected populations
This can happen in 
several countries 
simultaneously. For 
example, an agency 
might have to shift funds 
from one country to 
another due to a more 
urgent crisis
Engagement and consultation
Quality of services delivered
Protection provided
Information shared 
Adaption based on feedback 
Participatory Virtue
Sectorial International agencies, UN 
and international NGOs
Professional standards (e.g. Sphere), 
clusters (e.g. protection etc.)
Peer Mutual/collective
virtue
Colleagues Internal governance Supervisory Mechanism
Donors Reporting/framework agreement Fiscal Mechanism
Consortiums (Core 
Humanitarian Standards 
(CHS) etc.)
Self-certification and assessment Peer Mutual
Home country Donors Reporting Fiscal Mechanism
Media Access to records and data/news 
coverage
Public reputational Virtue
Public (taxpayers) Voting, public pressure Hierarchical/public 
reputational
Mechanism
Government regulations Government sanctions/country 
agreements
Hierarchical Mechanism
Bodies of law International human 
rights law, international 
refugee law, international 
humanitarian law,  
national courts and 
agencies
Upholding internationally 
recognised norms
National laws on charities
Legal/mutual Mechanism/virtue
Profession (e.g. 
medicine)
Professional associations Bodies of ethics
Licence to practice
Peer 
Hierarchical
Mutual
Professional publications Peer review Peer Mutual
National courts Research protocols and ethics Legal Mechanism
18  Ibid.
19  Adapted from Davis (n 3).
Refugee Law Initiative Working Paper 416
Even though organisations face multiple accountabilities, the lack of an agreed definition can blur responsibilities 
and makes measuring actual progress difficult. Hence, humanitarian organisations can declare their commitment to 
accountability, but the lack of clarity of the meaning of the concept can undermine accountability efforts and mean 
they have not substantially changed the way in which they work.20
In order to analyse humanitarian accountability further, the following two sections will rely on two accountability 
concepts, accountability as a virtue and accountability as a mechanism, developed by accountability scholar 
Mark Bovens.21 
20  Koppel (n 17).
21  Mark Bovens, ‘Two concepts of accountability: Accountability as a virtue and as a mechanism’ (2010) Western European Politics, Vol. 33, No. 
5, 946–967.
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3. Accountability as a mechanism 
Accountability as a mechanism is about the nature of relationships between different actors and has three important 
elements that need to be satisfied for an accountability relationship to be established. First, those in power should 
have an obligation to explain and justify their conduct after a wrongdoing or lack of trust from those judging. 
Second, there needs to be a forum to report to and, third, the forum needs to have the authority to sanction those 
in power. In this regard, accountability as a mechanism is ex post facto and an agent is accountable when there is a 
relationship between the agent and the forum in which the actor is obliged to explain and justify their conduct, and 
the forum can pose questions and pass judgement and the actor may face consequences.22 Hence, accountability has 
two important elements: to answer (answerability) for one’s action or inaction and, depending on the answer, face 
sanctions (enforcement), both positive and negative.23 In order to be effective it should identify those in power who 
are accountable and those who can demand answers.24 It means that those calling for an account have authority over 
those who are accountable, including rights to demand answers, use external scrutiny and to impose sanctions.25 
Hence the locus is not on the behaviour of an actor, but the way in which institutional arrangements operate to hold 
them to account.26 
The most obvious example of accountability as a mechanism in the humanitarian context is the relationship between 
humanitarian organisations and donors. An agreement has been signed that obliges the organisation to report to 
the donor who will then assess the results and make a judgement whether the goals have been met and whether to 
continue funding or not. Accountability as a mechanism in the humanitarian sector has mostly focused on value for 
money and showing results and project impact. To achieve this, donors have promoted results-based management 
(RBM) frameworks. RBM was introduced to the humanitarian realm as a form of new public management (NPM), 
analysing how organisations are spending their resources and project outcomes. In NPM, the public is viewed as 
a consumer operating within a free-market system, and RBM will ensure accountability and transparency to the 
taxpayer.27 Accordingly, organisations should demonstrate results, make adjustments for future programming and 
show value for money to become more accountable.28 
As a result, humanitarian organisations have become more results-oriented, and place more emphasis on monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms in order to identify successes and failures. However, lack of donor funding for in-depth 
evaluations has led to superficial evaluations and RBM efforts have not necessarily improved accountability.29 The 
emphasis on results has taken focus away from holding organisations to account for quality of decision making; for 
example, being accountable to populations not reached by aid or the unintended consequences of humanitarian 
action, such as prolonging wars, putting people at risk and fostering dependency instead of self-reliance.30 Thus, 
while a mechanism to hold organisations accountable exists, current practice seldom includes an obligation for 
humanitarian organisations to answer for action and inaction, for poor decisions or poor performance.
Over the past two decades the concept of accountability to affected populations (AAP) has become a mainstream 
approach among humanitarian organisations. APP was spurred by the so-called ‘Participation Revolution’, which 
emerged from the 2016 Grand Bargain agreements,31 the World Humanitarian Summit and Inter Agency Standing 
Committee’s (IASC) call for a ‘system-wide culture of accountability’.32 AAP emphasises participation and ownership 
from affected populations and should promote developing protection responses in a bottom-up fashion, fostering 
local protection capacity and preparedness. It aims to ensure that affected populations have the power to influence 
their situation and the decisions affecting them.33 Humanitarian organisations have in recent years intensified 
their efforts to allow affected populations to participate in the design, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian 
projects. This includes establishing two-way communication and most humanitarian organisations today have so-
called complaints and feedback mechanisms.34 These efforts have been enhanced by the use of information and 
22  Ibid; Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework’ (2007) European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, 447–468.
23  Davis (n 3) 4.
24  Robert Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”: An ever-expanding concept?’ (2000) Public Administration, Vol. 78, No. 3, 550–573, 555.
25  Ibid.
26  Bovens (n 21) 948.
27  Ben Ramalingam, John Mitchell, John Borton, Kristin Smart, ‘Counting what counts: Performance and effectiveness in the humanitarian 
sector’ (2009) ALNAP, 21–31 
<www.alnap.org/help-library/alnaps-8th-review-of-humanitarian-action-counting-what-counts-performance-and> accessed 10 December 2018. 
28  Steven Smith Rathgeb, ‘Accountability and the non-profit sector’, in Bovens, Goodin, Schillemans (n 1).
29  Roberts (n 3) 10.
30  Mark DuBois, ‘Humanitarian priorities: Accountability Meeting Report’ (2016) HERE, Geneva <http://here-geneva.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/Accountability-report_May2016.pdf> accessed 10 October 2018.
31  ‘The Grand Bargain – A shared commitment to better serve people in need’, (23 May 2016) Istanbul, Turkey, 10 <https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf>.
32  IASC outlines five main areas to achieve this: Leadership and governance; Transparency; Feedback and complaints mechanisms; 
Participation; and Design, monitoring and evaluation.
33  D Brown, A Donini, P Knox Clarke, ‘Engagement of crisis-affected people in humanitarian action’ (2014) Background Paper of ALNAP’s 29th 
Annual Meeting, 11–12 March, Addis Ababa. (London: ALNAP/ODI) <www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/background-
paper-29th-meeting.pdf>.
34  Francesca Bonino, Isabella Jean, Paul Knox Clarke, ‘Humanitarian feedback mechanisms: research, evidence and guidance’ (2014) ALNAP 
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communication technology and have enabled affected populations to get better access to humanitarian staff and 
organisations than ever before. Yet, complaints are often received by the staff from the same organisation that 
the complaint is addressing, which has proven to be highly problematic, in particular in cases of abuse. The 2018 
Oxfam scandal highlighted the need to keep advocating for more initiatives on accountability as a mechanism, as 
a complement to self-regulation and internal accountability measures.35 Research with affected populations shows 
a reluctance to make complaints about humanitarian agencies, fearing negative repercussions such as losing their 
assistance.36 This suggests that humanitarian organisations have not yet established a forum where they can be held 
accountable by affected populations, as outlined by Boven. 
The most controversial proposal to close this gap is the establishment of a humanitarian ombudsperson. The proposal 
was tabled twenty years ago by the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda after the failure to protect 
civilians during the Rwandan Genocide. Led by the British Red Cross, it envisioned an ombudsperson that would act 
as an independent, impartial body to regulate organisations’ activities in humanitarian emergencies, including failure 
to comply with any relevant legal obligations or codes of practice. It would also be able to receive and investigate 
complaints from affected populations and hold organisations to account for their activities in the field.37 The proposal 
gained limited support from humanitarian organisations, who were not keen to open themselves up to scrutiny 
from a third party.38 Twenty years later, Bennet, in her policy paper Constructive deconstruction: imagining alternative 
humanitarian action, suggests an independent watchdog Relief Watch, that evaluates the impact of humanitarian 
interventions using peer-to-peer and top-down approaches. This body would be governed by an independent board 
composed of individuals from outside the humanitarian sector but appointed by humanitarian organisations. It 
would have a peer-review system documenting ‘user’ experiences that would generate ‘user’ ratings. Based on these 
two forms of evaluation, the board would then make accountability ratings for organisations and these ratings could 
be used by agency boards and funders to ensure corrective action. Funding would be raised through an automatic 1 
per cent tax levied on all participating humanitarian actors, supplemented by private and/or pooled funds.39
Bennet’s proposal could move the sector closer to an accountability as a mechanism approach. Similar to the 
ombudsperson proposition, it relies on voluntary buy-in from humanitarian organisations who remain reluctant to 
yield power to an independent body that could make recommendations about their performance, behaviour and 
future funding. This might also well be why it has not yet been implemented and affected populations remain without 
a forum where they can hold humanitarian organisations to account. 
The NGO Ground Truth Solutions has pioneered a middle way, where it conducts interviews and surveys with affected 
populations to understand if humanitarian assistance is relevant and if they feel respected and trust the organisations 
working for them. It also inquires whether affected populations know how to seek recourse in cases of abuse.40 The 
results are then shared with humanitarian organisations. This provides affected populations with an independent 
actor (forum) to whom they can express their opinions and concerns without exposing themselves or fearing negative 
repercussions from the organisations assisting them. However, the decision of whether to act on such inputs still 
remains in the hands of humanitarian organisations.
Outside of donor relationships, there has been little support for any form of mechanism or external scrutiny to 
hold organisations to account. To address this gap, organisations need to become better at creating safe spaces for 
interaction with affected populations and invest more in building on populations’ capacities and self-protection 
mechanisms, as well as working with local governments and leaders.41 Generally, humanitarian organisations have 
not invested in developing accountability as a mechanism and without political will from humanitarian organisations 
to render power, the scope of any such accountability efforts will remain limited.
With few options of formal forms of accountability as a mechanism available, non-formal channels should not be 
ignored. The Oxfam scandal proves that, when formal mechanisms fail, non-formal mechanisms such as using public 
Study. (London: ALNAP/ODI) < https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-cda-study-feedback-mechanisms.pdf>.
35  Dorothea Hilhorst, ‘Aid agencies can’t police themselves. It’s time for a change’ IRIN (22 February 2018) <https://www.irinnews.org/
opinion/2018/02/22/aid-agencies-can-t-police-themselves-it-s-time-change> accessed 30 October 2018.
36  Kirsti Lattu, ‘To complain or not to complain still the question: Consultations with humanitarian aid beneficiaries on their perceptions 
of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse’ (2008) Humanitarian Accountability Partnership <www.pseataskforce.org/
uploads/tools/tocomplainornottocomplainstillthequestion_hapinternational_english.pdf> accessed 1 December 2018; Ground Truth Solutions 
and OECD ‘The Grand Bargain: Perspectives from the field’ (2018) <www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/Grand-Bargain-
briefing-note-June-2018.pdf> accessed 20 November 2018.
37  David Peppiat, ‘The Ombudsman Project: pilot project to investigate the concept of an Ombudsman for humanitarian assistance’ (1997) 
Humanitarian Practice Network – Relief and Rehabilitation Network, Issue 9 <https://odihpn.org/magazine/the-ombudsman-project-pilot-
project-to-investigate-the-concept-of-an-ombudsman-for-humanitarian-assistance/> accessed 15 December 2018.
38  Ian Christoplos, ‘A humanitarian ombudsman revisited?’ (15 March 2018) ALNAP <https://www.alnap.org/blogs/a-humanitarian-
ombudsman-revisited> accessed 30 October 2018.
39  Christina Bennet, ‘Constructive deconstruction: Imagining alternative humanitarian action’ (2018) HPG Working Paper, 12–13 <https://
www.odi.org/publications/11127-constructive-deconstruction-imagining-alternative-humanitarian-action> accessed 1 November 2018.
40  Ground Truth Solutions <https://groundtruthsolutions.org/> accessed 15 September 2019.
41  Dorothea Hilhorst, ‘Taking accountability to the next level’ in ‘Humanitarian Accountability Report: How can the World Humanitarian 
Summit make humanitarian response more effective?’ (2015) CHS Alliance, 109 
<www.chsalliance.org/files/files/CHS-Alliance-HAR-2015.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018; Larissa Fast, Kate Sutton, ‘Protection in local response 
to disasters: Challenges and insights from the Pacific region’ (2018) ODI <www.odi.org/publications/11209-protection-local-response-disasters-
challenges-and-insights-pacific-region> accessed 20 November 2018. 
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pressure and media reporting can be effective tools to achieve some degree of accountability in cases of misconduct 
or violations. Considering the lack of formal avenues available, using non-formal accountability forms can therefore 
be an effective way to make humanitarian organisations more accountable. Nevertheless, more research and funding 
should go into analysing how humanitarian organisations handle unwelcome feedback to ensure there is a real 
prospect of redress for victims of abuse and feedback is not merely tokenistic.42
42  Davis (n 3) 13; Dayna Brown, ‘Participation of crisis affected people in humanitarian decision-making processes’ in Lois Austin, 
Danya Brown, Paul Knox-Clarke, Imogen Wall (eds), ‘Humanitarian Accountability Report’ (2018) 31–34 <www.chsalliance.org/files/files/
Humanitarian%20Accountability%20Report%202018.pdf> accessed 20 November 2018.
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4. Accountability as a virtue
As discussed in the previous section, accountability as a mechanism only addresses issues ex post facto and, while fear 
of sanctions can be a motivator to make organisations accountable, it does not provide tools or incentives to ensure 
improvement.43 Moreover, a fear of losing funding can create an organisational culture that is defensive and closed.44 
Thus, humanitarian organisations generally do not consider it to be an effective tool to enhance their culture of 
accountability.45 Instead, they have been more committed to accountability as a virtue, which is a normative concept 
that defines accountable behaviour through, for example, standards. It is about a sense of responsibility or a willingness 
to act in a transparent, fair, compliant and equitable way and focuses on performance measured against standards. 
Being accountable is thus considered as a virtue, something that can qualify an actor in a positive way.46 Essential 
questions to be asked are: Who is accountable to whom, for what, by which standards and why?47 In this regard, 
Koppel outlines five dimensions of accountability for organisations: transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility 
and responsiveness to assess whether an organisation is accountable. Organisations can be held accountable under 
more than one dimension and the five dimensions are not mutually exclusive.48 
Table 2. Conceptions of accountability (Koppel 2005)
Conception of accountability Key determination
Transparency Did the organisation reveal the facts of its performance?
Liability Did the organisation face consequences for its performance?
Controllability Did the organisation do what the principal (overseer) desired?
Responsibility Did the organisation follow the rules?
Responsiveness Did the organisation fulfil the substantive expectation (demand or need)?49
While accountability as a virtue is widely used in the humanitarian sector, there is still no consensus about the 
standards for accountable behaviour. Instead, sectors and organisations have created their own standards that they 
choose to abide by. Currently, there are some seventy different local, regional and global accountability standards for 
humanitarian organisations50 and some 150 different tools for the same purpose.51 The most widely used standard 
is the 2014 Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS), which draws upon several previous 
standards and initiatives.52 The CHS sets out nine commitments and allows organisations to measure their compliance 
through self-evaluation, peer review, independent verification and certification.53
The nine commitments of the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate and relevant to their needs. Humanitarian assistance is 
appropriate and relevant. 
Communities and people affected by crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time. Response is effective 
and timely.
Communities and people affected by crisis are more prepared, resilient and less vulnerable as a result of humanitarian action. 
Humanitarian action strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects. 
Communities and people affected by crisis know their rights and entitlements and participate in decisions that affect them. 
Humanitarian action is based on open feedback and inclusive participation. 
Communities and people affected by crisis have access to a safe and responsive complaints mechanism. Complaints are welcomed 
and addressed.
Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance. Humanitarian action is coordinated and 
complementary.
43  Drake (n 3) 9–10.
44  Dubois (n 30) 4. 
45  Volker Turk, Elizabeth Eyster, ‘Strengthening accountability in UNHCR’ (2010) International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 22, No. 2, 159–172.
46  Bovens, Schillemans, Goodin (n 1).
47  Ibid.
48  Koppel (n 17) 95–99.
49  The demand approach is about citizen or constituent preferences and the need approach is assessing the policy goals of the organisation.
50  For more information, see: https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/.
51  Julien Carlier, Hugues Maury, ‘Peer review a way for the humanitarian sector to learn and improve’ (2015) Humanitarian Aid on the Move, 
Review No. 15, 23 <www.urd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HEM15_EN_Webpdf.pdf> accessed 15 September 2019.
52  Including but not limited to: The Code of Conduct of The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, 
The Sphere Core Standards, The 2010 HAP Standard, The People In Aid Code of Good Practice, Quality COMPAS, ALNAP Evaluation Guidelines, 
OECD-DAC Criteria, IASC Commitments on Accountability to Affected Populations (CAAP), The Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, The IFRC 
Disaster Law Programme Model, The Global Humanitarian Platform Principles of Partnership.
53  The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org>.
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The organisation learns from experience in order to improve outcomes for communities and people affected by crisis. Humanitarian 
actors continuously learn and improve. 
Staff are treated fairly and equitably and are supported to do their job effectively. Humanitarian staff are managed and supported 
responsibly.
Organisations use resources efficiently and effectively for their intended purpose. Resources are used and managed responsibly.
A substantial part of the standards relates to AAP. For example, Commitment 1 requires assistance is appropriate 
and relevant to the needs of affected populations; 4 – affected populations should participate in decisions that 
affect them and humanitarian action should be based on feedback and participation from affected populations; 5 
– populations have access to a safe and responsive complaints mechanism and complaints are responded to; and 
7 – ‘organisation learns from experience in order to improve outcomes for communities and people affected by crisis’. 
While standards and commitment to AAP have become a priority for many organisations, definitions and approaches 
to AAP among, and sometimes within, organisations vary and there are few tools to measure AAP outcomes. Thus, 
measuring progress and achievement is difficult. Moreover, there are few incentives for organisations to change their 
decision-making processes to allow affected populations to participate in them.54 Consequently, AAP initiatives have 
so far done little to change the power dynamics between affected populations and humanitarian organisations, and 
affected populations still have little control over the organisations that provide them services.55
In the pursuit of AAP, some organisations have borrowed a client approach from the private sector, promising to place 
the satisfaction of the ‘client’ at the centre of the organisation’s efforts. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is 
one of the leading organisations applying this model through their Client Voice and Choice Initiative.56 IRC claims that 
its policy is deliberately provocative in highlighting the current lack of power of many of the people it works for and 
the IRC’s desire to transfer power to them. The policy builds on the notion that clients (affected populations) who 
receive their services (humanitarian assistance and protection) should be able to change provider if the service does 
not meet their expectations.57 
Even though AAP and the increased push for a more business-like model measuring ‘customer satisfaction’ is considered 
to have led to more consultation and participation of affected populations, little progress seems to have been made 
on enabling affected populations to meaningfully engage in decision-making processes and structures regarding 
decisions that affect their lives. A review of the current state of affairs found that affected populations continue to be 
far from the centres of power58 and AAP was the weakest performance area for humanitarian organisations.59 Likewise, 
Hhumanitarian organisations themselves often have limited power in relation to their donors. Donors pay for the 
services that humanitarian organisations provide but affected populations do not pay their providers. Thus, the drivers 
and incentives of the humanitarian system create supply-side accountability to donors and to headquarters, which 
does not always align with meaningful accountability for outcomes in the countries where they operate.60 Without 
donors allowing humanitarian organisations to invest time and resources in AAP, they are likely to prioritise securing 
funding over engaging with or implementing feedback from affected populations.61 This imbalance of bargaining 
power makes it difficult for organisations to systematically adapt to feedback and address issues unless they match 
donor priorities. Furthermore, most humanitarian organisations have specific mandates and cannot satisfy all needs, 
which can lead to false expectations and distress among affected populations. 
Engaging affected populations in a way that improves accountability is no easy task and organisations often consider 
comprehensive participatory approaches time-consuming, and thus not practical in emergency situations where 
urgent needs must be addressed quickly. 
While aspiring to be bottom-up, in practice AAP has generally been based on top-down high-level donor commitments, 
and guidance and policy on AAP often takes humanitarian organisations as the starting point. There are few examples 
of demand-driven accountability initiated from affected populations.62 Likewise, the academic literature reveals few 
studies which explore the degree to which affected populations can influence humanitarian programming or impact 
organisational learning. Reversely, humanitarian organisations often have a pre-defined rationalisation that might 
not match what is most important to affected populations.63 One study showed that refugees who demanded a right 
54  Austin, Brown, Knox Clarke, Wall (n 9).
55  Roberts (n 3) 2. 
56  Chloë Whitley, Alyoscia D’Onofrio, Sheree Bennet, ‘IRC Client Voice and Choice Initiative: Making the case and making the difference: 
Strategies to promote client responsive humanitarian aid’ (2016) IRC <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/926/160831cvcbriefi
ngpaper-responsiveness-final.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018.
57  Ibid.
58  Austin, Brown, Knox Clarke, Wall (n 9).
59  Brown, Donini, Knox Clarke (n 33); ‘Humanitarian Accountability Report’ (2013) Humanitarian Accountability Partnership <www.alnap.org/
system/files/content/resource/files/main/2013-har.pdf> accessed 15 October 2018; Ground Truth Solutions (n 40).
60  DuBois (n 30); Roberts (n 3) 4; International Rescue Committee ‘Client Voice and Choice Initiative and Ground Truth Solutions pilot case 
study: Protection Programme Juba, South Sudan’ (June 2016) 2 
<www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/942/irccvc-gtpilots-casestudybprotectionandannexes.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018. 
61  Roberts (n 3) 7–10.
62  Hilhorst (n 41) 108–109.
63  Roberts (n 3) 4–5.
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to agenda-setting were met with repression by humanitarian agencies who labelled this ‘politicisation’.64 Similarly, 
another study showed that inputs were sought from refugees to support donor proposals and reporting, rather than 
for the purposes of adapting and improving programme quality.65 
While most humanitarian actors remain committed to accountability as a virtue, organisations like Doctors Without 
Borders (MSF) continue to be critical of the ‘one size fits all’ approach. MSF questions the standard setting rhetoric, 
arguing that too much attention to standards can make humanitarian action technocratic and can fail to address 
ethical and political dimensions of humanitarian crises, such as creating safe environments, saving lives and 
monitoring and upholding respect for international humanitarian law.66 It argues that humanitarian organisations 
should not be assessed on processes, i.e. number of people trained, and activities delivered, but rather on the impact 
of outcomes, i.e. number of lives saved.67
Accountability as a virtue is the most common approach adopted by humanitarian organisations, but such an 
approach makes them vulnerable to ‘cosmetic compliance’, since compliance is often self-monitored without any 
external oversight. Despite positive development from humanitarian organisations in putting more efforts into 
engaging with affected populations and establishing feedback and complaints mechanisms, it appears that it has not 
necessarily led to improved accountability to affected populations. For example, like other standards in the sector, 
the Core Humanitarian Standards remain voluntary and there is no punishment for non-compliance or incentive for 
compliance. Hence, while organisations can be well-intentioned, being associated with a standard could be seen as 
acting virtuously without addressing real accountability gaps.
64  Elizabet Olivius, ‘(Un)governable subjects: The limits of refugee participation in the promotion of gender equality in humanitarian aid’ 
(2013) Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 42–61, 57–60.
65  Whitley, D’Onofrio, Bennet (n 55) 2.
66  Fabien Dubuet, ‘What is humanitarian accountability?’ (2002) MSF <www.msf.fr/sites/default/files/2002-04-01-Dubuet.pdf> accessed 5 
October 2018; Eric Stobbaerts, Nicolas de Torrente, ‘MSF and accountability: From global buzzwords to specific solutions’ (2008) Humanitarian 
Exchange Magazine 41, 46–49 <https://odihpn.org/magazine/msf-and-accountability-from-global-buzzwords-to-specific-solutions/> accessed 
15 September 2019.
67  DuBois (n 9) 9.
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5. Conclusion
Humanitarian organisations operate in contexts where they must make difficult decisions about where, how and 
into whom they will invest their time and resources. Thus, humanitarian organisations are constantly responding to a 
variety of stakeholders and within multiple layers of accountability regulations. Dealing with multiple accountabilities 
can be a legitimate obstacle to improving accountability and organisations must know how to prioritise in order to 
achieve their accountability objectives. An organisation could be investing more time in engagement with affected 
populations but if it does not have the support from donors allowing it the resources or tools to address issues 
raised by affected populations or adapt programming accordingly, it can become a mere tick box exercise. Donors 
have focused more on standards and results frameworks for efficiency and best value for money rather than real 
outcomes for affected populations. Humanitarian organisations could therefore become better at identifying their 
own strengths and weaknesses when it comes accountability and prioritise their accountability relationships and 
efforts. This means being practical and honest about to whom and how they are accountable. Further, the context and 
conditions should inform decisions about what kind of accountability is desirable and appropriate. If humanitarian 
organisations and donors recognise the challenges and limitations of the system in which they operate, perhaps more 
realistic goals can be set for humanitarian accountability.
Most humanitarian accountability efforts have been focused on accountability as a virtue, where accountability is 
used as a normative concept, and a set of standards for virtuous behaviour or as a desirable state of affairs. This 
has led to investment in voluntary standards and procedures, such as the Core Humanitarian Standards, which are 
intended to make organisations more accountable. While major advancements have been made in standard setting, 
organisations have to evaluate their own success through self-reporting as there is no independent body addressing 
lack of compliance or situations of abuse. This means that these efforts have not been systematically accompanied by 
other forms of accountability such as external review or scrutiny. Considering the stark power imbalances and the lack 
of a formal accountability relationship between affected populations and humanitarian organisations, relying too 
heavily on accountability as a virtue can thus create unrealistic expectations for accountability to affected populations. 
Notwithstanding major advancements in accountability as a virtue, the literature suggests that humanitarian 
organisations continue to struggle to substantially improve accountability to affected populations.
Much less emphasis has been placed on accountability as a mechanism, where an organisation must justify their 
actions not in a void, but in a forum that can pass judgement. Outside of donor relationships there are few such 
mechanisms present to hold organisations accountable. This is partly due to the reluctance of humanitarian 
organisations to cede power, but also to the nature of the humanitarian system where organisations operate on a 
global scale across borders with no one regulatory body that can hold them to account. Engagement with affected 
populations, including complaints and feedback mechanisms which are today standard practice, is a major step 
forward for accountability. Nevertheless, the lack of trust in humanitarian organisations means affected populations 
remain reluctant to report discontent or abuse. This is partly due to power imbalances between them but also because 
of the lack of an independent body to receive and investigate such complaints. 
Humanitarian accountability has in recent years often become synonymous with many other values like transparency, 
responsibility, inclusion and participation. Rather than being synonymous to accountability, these values should be 
seen as essential to achieve accountability. For example, allowing affected populations to engage through complaints 
and feedback mechanisms or other forms of engagement can be essential to achieve accountability but does not 
in itself necessarily constitute accountability to affected populations unless it is accompanied by other elements 
that can ensure enforcement and compliance. Research from social accountability work in fragile contexts suggests 
that approaches that combine different forms of accountability, for example allowing more external scrutiny 
to complement virtue accountability efforts, are more successful than those that only focus on one form.68 If 
humanitarian organisations continue to focus all efforts on accountability as a virtue without simultaneously investing 
in other forms of accountability, they risk limiting the impact of such efforts. This is an area that has been little explored 
by humanitarian organisations and therefore there is room for further research and practical exploration by the 
humanitarian sector. Whether humanitarian accountability is considered to be successful will ultimately depend on 
how much those in power are willing to relinquish such power and what form of accountability we expect to achieve.
68  Nixon, Buffardi, Wales, Pasanen (n 15) 14–15.
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